Vor einigen Wochen habe ich bereits auf einen Aufsatz von Paul Boghossian zum Thema “Soziale Konstruktionen” hingewiesen. Ich bin daran, sein Buch “Fear of Knowledge” zu lesen. Es hat mich unwahrscheinlich beruhigt zu lesen, dass der New Yorker Philosophe
- sich sehr lange mit dem Thema beschäftigen musste
- gleich zu Beginn anmerkt, dass er sich mit Denkvoraussetzungen beschäftigt, die längst Allgemeingut, ja sogar den Status der Orthodoxie hätten
- von einer Entfremdung zwischen der Analytischen Philosophie und vielen Zweigen der Geisteswissenschaften in dieser Thematik spricht
In einer der Philosophen eigenen Klarheit stellt er die Ansätze der Klassischen Erkenntnistheorie und des Sozialen Konstruktivismus gegenüber:
The Classical Picture of Knowledge:
Objectivism about Facts: The world which we seek to understand and know about is what it is largely independently of us and our beliefs about it. Even if thinking beings had never existed, the world would still have had many of the properties that it currently has.
Objectivism about Justification: Facts of the form—information E justifies belief B—are society-independent facts. In particular, whether or not some item of information justifies a given belief does not depend on the contingent needs and interests of any community.
Objectivism about Rational Explanation: Under the appropriate circumstances, our exposure to the evidence alone is capable of explaining why we believe what we believe.
Constructivism about Knowledge:
Constructivism about Facts: The world which we seek to understand and know about is not what it is independently of us and our social context; rather, all facts are socially constructed in a way that reflects our contingent needs and interests.
Constructivism about Justification: Facts of the form—information E justifies belief B—are not what they are independently of us and our social context; rather, all such facts are constructed in a way that reflects our contingent needs and interests.
Constructivism about Rational Explanation: It is never possible to explain why we believe what we believe solely on the basis of our exposure to the relevant evidence; our contingent needs and interests must also be invoked.
