Die Schöpfer-/Geschöpf-Unterscheidung

Vernon S. Poythress in seinem neuen Buch “Logic – A God-centered Approach to the Foundation of Western Thought”, S. 138:

The Bible teaches that God the Creator is distinct from the creatures he has made. This distinction is called the Creator-creature distinction. There are two levels of being, God and creature, rather than one. This two-level situation has implications for the use of terms in logic. Can we have one term, father, that applies both to God and to human creatures who are biological fathers? Clearly we …can. But God’s fatherhood and human fatherhood are not on the same level. So the relation between the two is one of analogy rather than strict identity. The introduction of analogy means that syllogistic reasoning will not necessarily be valid when applied to “fatherhood” as a general category. Similar results follow even if we talk about God as “creator,” because we also use the word creator in a looser sense for human creators. Henry Ford “created” the automobile assembly line. An artist “creates” a masterpiece. These acts of “creation” are “subcreations,” in contrast to the original act of God in creating the world. Thus the word creator can be used in at least two different ways. We might suppose that syllogistic logic would work with less difficulty if we used it only for a one-level situation. So logicians confront the temptation to pretend that reality has only one level. Or, to put it another way, a logician may imagine that he can subject all of reality to the requirement that we have terms without any built-in analogies. He attempts to view God and God’s creatures “from above,” from a superior point of view that can capture everything in one grand viewpoint. He hopes to make reasoning work in a uniform way over the whole field. He will have high-level labels that apply equally and uniformly to both Creator and creature. To do so, he tacitly makes himself superior to God. He has to be superior, in principle, if he is to control precisely the expressions that he will employ in order to determine what can be the case both with the Creator and the creature. He denies his creaturely status. He also denies the fundamental character of the Creator-creature distinction.